In a zero-sum stochastic game, at each stage, two adversary players take decisions and receive a stage payoff determined by them and by a random variable representing the state of nature. The total payoff is the discounted sum of the stage payoffs. Assume that the players are very patient and use optimal strategies. We then prove that, at any point in the game, players get essentially the same expected payoff: the payoff is constant. This solves a conjecture by Sorin, Venel and Vigeral (2010) . The proof relies on the semi-algebraic approach for discounted stochastic games introduced by Bewley and Kohlberg (1976) , on the theory of Markov chains with rare transitions, initiated by Friedlin and Wentzell (1984), and on some variational inequalities for value functions inspired by the recent work of Davini, Fathi, Iturriaga and Zavidovique (2016) .
their differences, absorbing games and games with incomplete information have in common that the dynamics of the game has an irreversible property, which is not present in stochastic games.
The main contribution of this paper is to establish that finite stochastic games have the constant payoff property, and thus to solve the conjecture in Sorin, Venel and Vigeral [17] . The property is established in a strong sense: under any optimal play, the cumulated payoff up to a fraction t ∈ [0, 1] of the game will be approximatively equal to tv * (k), for any sufficiently small discount factor. On its own, our result provides a new remarkable property for these games. Moreover, our analysis has brought into light new useful connections between the limit value function and some occupation measures on the state space induced by the optimal strategies, as well as new variational inequalities. The first part of our proof relies heavily on the algebraic approach developed by Bewley and Kohlberg [1] , namely that the value function v λ and optimal stationary strategies can be developed as a Puiseux series in a neighborhood of 0. Thanks to these expansions, the random times spent in each state (or set of states), as λ goes to 0 can be well studied with the theory of Markov chains with rare transitions initiated by Friedlin and Wentzell [7] , and developed by Catoni and Cerf [4] , Trouvé [19] and others. Building on the hierarchy of cycles, we focus on relevant cycles which are those in which the state stays a non-negligible fraction of the game. This way, one can characterise the constant payoff property in terms of a property satisfied by the occupation measures induced by the optimal strategies. The second part builds on a recent result from Davini, Fathi, Iturriaga and Zavidovique [6] , from which we establish useful variational inequalities for the discounted value functions. These two arguments prove the weak constant payoff property, that is, the existence of a couple of optimal strategies for which the cumulated payoff grows linearly with time. In order to extend the constant payoff property to any profile of optimal strategies, the third ingredient of the proof is the introduction of an auxiliary Markov decision process where a fictitious decision-maker aims at maximizing the discounted average of the total variation of the values during the play. We show that the value of this MDP converges to 0 as the discount factor vanishes, and that this property is equivalent to the constant payoff property.
The paper is divided as follows. Section 2 presents the model and main result. Section 3 is devoted to the proof of the weak constant payoff property. Section 4 proves the strong property. Section 5 is devoted to some remarks and extensions.
Model and main results

Standard stochastic games
We consider throughout this paper a standard two player zero-sum stochastic game, as introduced by Shapley [14] . Such games are described by a 5-tuple Γ = (K, I, J, g, q), where K is the set of states, I and J are the action sets of Player 1 and 2 respectively, g : K × I × J → R is the payoff function and q : K × I × J → ∆(K) is the transition function. For each finite set X, we denote by ∆(X) the set of probability distributions over X. We assume that K, I and J are finite sets. We set g := max (k,i,j) |g(k, i, j)|.
The stochastic game Γ λ (k)
For any discount factor λ ∈ (0, 1] and any k ∈ K, the λ-discounted game with initial state k is denoted by Γ λ (k) and proceeds as follows: at every stage m ≥ 1, knowing the current state k m , the players choose simultaneously and independently actions i m and j m ; Player 1 receives the stage payoff g(k m , i m , j m ), and Player 2 receives −g(k m , i m , j m ). A new state k m+1 is drawn according to the probability q(· | k m , i m , j m ) and communicated to both players, together 2 with (i m , j m ). Player 1 maximizes the expectation of the λ-discounted average of the stage payoffs, i.e. the expectation of:
The sequence (k 1 , i 1 , j 1 , ..., k m , i m , j m , ...) generated along the game is called a play. The set of plays is (K × I × J)
Definition 2.1.
2 The observation of the past actions is known as perfect monitoring. An extension to a more general model, in which the players receive signals, is described in Section 5.3.
(i) A strategy for a player specifies a mixed action to each possible set of past observations:
formally, a strategy for Player 1 is a collection of maps σ 1 = (σ 1 ) m≥1 , where σ (ii) A stationary strategy plays according to the current state only. Formally, a stationary strategy for Player 1 is a mapping x 1 : K → ∆(I). Similarly, a stationary strategy for Player 2 is a mapping x 2 : K → ∆(J).
(iii) A strategy profile is a pair of strategies (σ 1 , σ 2 ).
N.B. The set of strategies will be denoted by Σ 1 and Σ 2 , the sets of stationary strategies by ∆(I) K and ∆(J) K .
We denote by P k σ 1 ,σ 2 the unique probability measure on the set of plays (K × I × J) N such that, for any finite play h n = (k 1 = k, i 1 , j 1 , . . . , k n−1 , i n−1 , j n−1 , k n ) one has: The extension to infinite plays follows from Kolmogorov's extension theorem. Thus, P k σ 1 ,σ 2 is the unique probability measure on plays induced by (σ 1 , σ 2 ) in the stochastic game starting from state k (the dependence on the transition function q is omitted, because it is an intrinsic datum of the problem).
The expectation with respect to P k σ 1 ,σ 2 is denoted by E k σ 1 ,σ 2 , and the expected payoff by:
By Shapley [14] , the game Γ λ (k) has a value:
v λ (k) = max
A strategy σ 1 ∈ Σ 1 is optimal for Player 1 if it realizes the left-hand side maximum. A strategy σ 2 ∈ Σ 2 is optimal for Player 2 if it realizes the right-hand side minimum. Both players have optimal stationary strategies. The set of optimal stationary strategies for Player i = 1, 2 is denoted by X i λ ; the set of (general) optimal strategies by Σ i λ .
The semi-algebraic approach
Fix λ ∈ (0, 1] and let v λ ∈ R K be the vector of values. Let (
λ be a couple of optimal stationary strategies. Building on Shapley's results, Bewley and Kohlberg [1] defined a subset S ⊂ R × R K × R K×I × R K×J by setting (λ, v, x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ S if and only the following relations hold:
• λ ∈ R is some discount factor, that is 0 < λ ≤ 1
K is the vector of values of the λ-discounted stochastic game Γ λ
• (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ R K×I × R K×J is a couple of optimal stationary strategies in Γ λ By Shapley [14] the set S is semi-algebraic, as it can be described by the following finite set of polynomial equalities and inequalities:
0 < λ ≤ 1 ∀(k, i), x 1 (k, i) ≥ 0, and ∀k, i∈I x 1 (k, i) = 1 ∀(k, j), x 2 (k, j) ≥ 0, and ∀k, j∈J x 2 (k, j) = 1 ∀(k, j), i∈I x 1 (k, i) λg(k, i, j) + (1 − λ)
By the Tarski-Seidenberg elimination theorem, λ → v λ is a real semi-algebraic function and there exist a selection of optimal strategies (x
λ (k, j) are real semi-algebraic functions as well, for all (k, i, j). Yet any bounded real semi-algebraic function f : (0, 1] → R admits a Taylor expansion in fractional powers (a.k.a. Puiseux expansion) in some neighborhood of 0, i.e. there exists λ 0 ∈ (0, 1], N ∈ N * and a real sequence (a m ) m≥0 such that:
The first remarkable consequence of this approach is that the vector of values v λ converges as λ vanishes. The limit will be denoted by v * . The second is the existence of an optimal Puiseux strategy profile, defined as follows. Definition 2.2. An optimal Puiseux strategy profile is a family of optimal stationary profiles (x 1 λ , x 2 λ ) λ such that, for some λ 0 ∈ (0, 1] and some N ∈ N * , the mappings λ → x 1 λ (k, i) and λ → x 2 λ (k, j) are real Puiseux series on (0, λ 0 ) with common 3 denominator N , for all (k, i, j) ∈ K ×I ×J.
The game on [0, 1]
The discount factor λ can be interpreted in several different manners, such as:
(a) The interaction may stop, i.e. at every stage m ≥ 1, the game stops with probability λ.
(b) The players are impatient, i.e. payoffs at stage m are more valuable than the same payoffs at stage m + 1. In this interpretation, the discount factor stands for an interest rate. (c) Stages have decreasing weights, i.e. every stage m ≥ 1 has a weight θ m := λ(1 − λ) m−1 , which indicates the importance of the stage. Note that θ m > 0 and m≥1 θ m = 1 so that the overall payoff is a weighted average of the stage payoffs.
Though the three interpretations are equivalent for all purposes, (c) presents an appealing feature: one can define some sort of clock which indicates the fraction of the game at any given stage. For any discount factor λ ∈ (0, 1], one defines:
Hence, η(λ, M ) is the total weight of stages 1, . . . , M in the λ-discounted game. For any λ ∈ (0, 1), the function η(λ, · ) is strictly increasing from N to the interval [0, 1). Let ⌊x⌋ be the integer part of x. Note that for any ε > 0 and α > 0, the following relations hold:
For 0 < ǫ < 1, the terms ⌊αλ −1+ε ⌋, ⌊αλ −1 ⌋, and ⌊αλ −1−ε ⌋ go to +∞ as λ tends to 0, but according to (2) they correspond (asymptotically) to very different times of the game: the first one converges to a fraction 0 of the game, the second converges to a fraction 1 − e −α ∈ (0, 1), and the third one converges to 1. In the sequel, we will sometimes refer to the fraction 0 of the game as "the beginning of the game", and to the fraction 1 as the "end of the game". Remark 2.3. Note that there are many possible ways to define the fraction 0 of the game: f (λ) = 1 and f (λ) = ⌊λ −1/2 ⌋ both have the property that lim λ→0 η(λ, f (λ)) = 0. For our purposes (see Section 3.1), it will be convenient to set the "beginning of the game" at stage ⌊λ −1+ 1 2N ⌋, and "the end of the game" at stage ⌊λ
Conversely, for any fraction of the game t ∈ [0, 1] and any discount factor λ, there exists some stage such that the total weight of the previous stages first exceed t. This yields to the definition of an inverse-clock ϕ(λ, t) ∈ N * :
Note that ϕ(λ, 0) = 1 for all λ and that, as λ tends to 0, the following relation holds for all t ∈ [0, 1):
3 By finiteness, one can assume without loss of generality that N and λ0 are common in the expansions of
The notion of clock and inverse-clock, which are now standard, were initiated by Sorin [16] . It allows to consider the discrete-time game Γ λ (k) as a game played in the time interval [0, 1]. In particular, for any fraction t ∈ [0, 1] one can define the cumulated payoff up to time t. Definition 2.4. For any k ∈ K and λ ∈ (0, 1], and any strategy profile (σ 1 , σ 2 ) of Γ λ (k), we define the cumulated payoff up to time t ∈ [0, 1] as follows:
Note that this definition extends (1) since γ λ (k, σ 1 , σ 2 ; 1) = γ λ (k, σ 1 , σ 2 ) for all k, σ 1 , σ 2 and λ.
Main result
Our main result is a precise characterisation of the cumulated payoff at time t, when both players use optimal strategies. 
Our result solves the conjecture raised by Sorin, Venel and Vigeral [17] . Note that the constant payoff property is established for any optimal strategy profile, that is, not necessarily stationary, nor of Puiseux type. An extension to asymptotically optimal strategies is described in Section 5.4.
Sketch of the proof
The aim of this section is to guide the reader through the proof of Theorem 2.5, by providing an overlook of its main parts. To go straight to the proof, the reader may directly go to Section 3.
The proof is divided in 6 parts: parts 1-4 establish the so-called weak constant payoff property, that is, that any optimal Puiseux strategy profile (x 1 λ , x 2 λ ) λ induces a constant payoff; parts 5 and 6 conclude the proof, by extending the constant payoff property to any optimal strategy profile. λ ) λ be some fixed optimal Puiseux strategy profile and let Q λ be the Markov chain on the state space induced by this profile. By the choice of (x 1 λ , x 2 λ ) λ , the family (Q λ ) λ is a family of Markov chains with rare transitions, so that one can define a hierarchy of cycles, as in the theory developed by Friedlin and Wentzell [7] . Because of the discounting, only some of these cycles will be relevant, that is, cycles in which the chain stays a positive fraction of the game. States which do not belong to any relevant cycle are transient in the sense that the chain stays a negligible fraction of the game in them. The state space is thus partitioned into relevant cycles and transient states. This way, we obtain the relation Π t = t 0 π s ds for all t ∈ (0, 1), where π t and Π t are the following limit matrices in R K×K :
• It may be helpful to think of π t as the probability that starting from k, the chain will be in k ′ at the fraction t of the game, even if it is not exactly the case.
Part 2.
From the results in part 1, we deduce the following properties about the limit of the cumulated payoff and the vector of limit values v * ∈ R K :
• For any relevant cycle C and any k, k ′ ∈ C one has:
• The weak constant payoff property holds for any initial state belonging to an absorbing cycle, that is, a relevant cycle where the chain stays more that ⌊λ
• If the weak constant property holds for any initial state that belongs to a relevant cycle, it holds for any initial state (that is, for any initial transient state as well).
In view of the previous results we restrict our attention to initial states which belong to recurrent cycles, that is, relevant cycles that are not absorbing. These cycles are left after a positive fraction of the game.
Part 3. By restricting our attention to an initial state belonging to a recurrent cycle, we then establish two useful formulae: one for v * and one for Π := lim λ→0 λ(Id − (1 − λ)Q λ ) −1 (note that Π = lim t→1 Π t ). Building on a variational inequality recently established by Davini, Fathi, Iturriaga and Zavidovique [6] in the framework of Hamilton-Jacobi equations, we then prove two variational inequalities satisfied by the discounted values v λ and v λ ′ for 0 < λ ′ < λ, and an explicit expression for the derivative of λ → v λ , in terms of a family of discounted occupation measures. Taking λ to 0, and using the previous results, we obtain the following important invariance property:
This is the cornerstone for deducing that, for any recurrent cycle C, the average payoff obtained inside the cycle before leaving it, and the expected payoff on the exit date, are both equal to v * (k), for any k ∈ C.
Part 4. The previous invariance properties yield the following stronger invariance property
This means that as λ vanishes, v * (k ϕ(λ,t) ) converges to a real-valued martingale. We conclude the proof by combining this property with a continuous-time version of the Shapley equation: 
of a stochastic game, we obtain an equivalent formulation of the strong constant payoff property in terms of the values of δλ-discounted single-player games, namely, their convergence to 0.
Part 6. For each initial statek ∈ K, λ ∈ (0, 1] and δ > 0, we define a single-player optimization problem M DPk ,δ,λ as follows:
• the set of states is K
• for every m ≥ 1, the current state k m is observed, in particular the initial statek
• the action set depends on the current state and on λ: the action set at k m = k is the set of optimal strategy profiles of the I ×J-matrix game (λg(k, i, j)
• the payoff function depends onk and λ, but not on actions:
• the discount factor is δλ Using the semi-algebraic approach introduced by Bewley and Kohlberg [1] , we show that this Markov decision process admits optimal stationary strategies λ → z λ that admit an expansion in Puiseux series in some neighborhood of 0. Yet, by construction,
is an optimal Puiseux strategy profile of the original game so that, by the weak constant payoff property established earlier, the payoff vanishes as λ tends to 0. It follows that the value w δ λ (k) of the MDP with initial statē k converges to 0 as λ vanishes, for any δ > 0, which concludes the proof.
The weak constant payoff property
The aim of this section, divided into 4 parts, is to prove the following result. 
λ ) denote some fixed optimal Puiseux strategy profile. For each initial state k, the probability over the set of histories (K × I × J) N induced by this strategy profile is denoted by P k λ . The corresponding expectation will be denoted by E k λ .
Part 1: Perturbed Markov chains
By stationarity 4 , for each λ ∈ (0, 1], the sequence of states (k m ) m≥1 follows a Markov chain over the state space K. Let Q λ ∈ R K×K denote its transition matrix, which is explicitly given by:
Clearly, the transition function λ → Q λ inherits the same regularity as the strategies, namely
′ ) > 0 and e(k, k ′ ) ∈ {m/N, m ∈ N} such that as λ goes to 0:
This property ensures that any ratio of finite products of entries of Q λ converges in [0, +∞]. Thus, the theory developed by Freidlin and Wentzell [7] for perturbed dynamical systems applies 5 and one can describe the asymptotic behavior of the family of Markov chains (Q λ ) λ as λ vanishes in terms of the so-called hierarchy of cycles (see below, Section 3.1.1). This idea is to consider the chains not only at infinity, but also at infinities of different orders: though the asymptotic behavior of a fixed Markov chain is well captured by studying the law of k m as m → +∞, a good understanding of the asymptotic behavior of (Q λ ) λ is obtained by studying the law of k ⌊αλ −d ⌋ as λ vanishes, for all α > 0 and suitable d > 0.
Cycle decomposition
Let us briefly recall some useful results about what Freidlin and Wentzell call the hierarchy of cycles. For more details on the results presented in this section, we refer the reader to Trouvé [19] or to Catoni and Cerf [4] who studied more closely the case of finite Markov chains in a simulated annealing framework. In our case, we deal with what is known as the "constant cooling schedule", which is a particular case of the latter. We invite the reader which is familiar with this theory to jump directly to the formal definitions.
Informally, a cycle is either a singleton (i.e. every state is a cycle by convention) or a set of states in which the chain stays an exponentially distributed number of stages, going back and forth an exponentially distributed number of times between any pair of states before leaving the cycle. To grasp the intuition behind this decomposition, we consider an example; formal definitions will be given right after.
Illustration
Let (R λ ) λ be a family of stochastic matrices over K = {1, 2, 3, 4} with the property that λ → R λ (k, k ′ ) is a Puiseux series for each (k, k ′ ) ∈ K 2 , over some common interval (0, λ 0 ). As the asymptotic properties of the chain are fully determined by the leading terms of these series (see Solan and Vieille [15, Theorem 2]), we will only specify these terms:
The different orders of the Markov chain can be illustrated as follows: 4 Of the model, and of the fixed strategy profile. 5 The family (Q λ ) λ is completely asymptotically regular, in the words of Freidlin and Wentzell. The common denominator of all the Puiseux expansions (or, rather, of all their leading terms) is N = 3. Hence, in order to understand the asymptotic behavior of the family (R λ ) λ it is appropriate to consider the chain at different time-scales, that is after a number of stages of order λ −m/3 , for m = 0, 1, 2, 3 . . . Before we describe the cycles let us point out that, in addition to the subset of states composing it, each cycle can be described by the following 5 characteristics:
• Exit height
The exit height specifies the order of the number of stages that the chain spends in the cycle before leaving it; the exit rate gives the parameter of the exponentially distributed time of escape; the exit distribution is the (asymptotic) probability over the state space on the exit date. Similarly, the mixing height specifies the order of the number of stages that the chain needs to visit all the states in the cycle; the mixing distribution is the (asymptotic) frequency of visits to each of these states before leaving the cycle. Both exit distributions and mixing distributions will be considered as elements of ∆(K). One crucial aspect about these characteristics is that they do not depend on the initial state within the cycle. Another one is the fact that states that belong to the same cycle will behave like "an aggregated state" at any order strictly higher than their mixing height. It is also convenient to point out that both exit heights and mixing heights will be non-negative multiples of 1/N .
We are now ready to study the hierarchy of cycles, and their characteristics. By convention, each state is a cycle. The exit height E(k) ≥ 0 of state k is the least non-negative real number such that the probability of leaving k in less than ⌊λ −α ⌋ stages tends to 1 as λ vanishes. Clearly, one has E(1) = 0, E(2) = E(3) = 1/3 and E(4) = 2/3. The exit rates (r k ) k and exit distributions (p k ) k are r 1 = ln 2, r 2 = r 3 = 5 and r 4 = 1, and p 1 = (0, In order to compute the rest of the cycles it is convenient to consider the chain after a number of stages of order λ −m/N −ε , for some ε ∈ (0, 1/N ) and for all m ∈ N. The idea for such a choice is to ensure that all transitions which occur at the order λ −m/N have already occurred (possibly a great number of times), and that no transition occurring at order λ −(m+1)/N has occurred yet. In the sequel, we will take ε = 1 2N . Time-scale 0. After ⌊λ −1/6 ⌋ stages, only transitions from state 1 occur (i.e. the probability of such transitions converges to 1 as λ vanishes). Consequently, there are no new cycles at this timescale.
Time-scale 1/3. After ⌊λ −1/3−1/6 ⌋ stages, transitions between states 2 and 3 occur as well. More precisely, the number of times that the chain goes back and forth between these two states before leaving the set {2, 3} is an exponentially distributed random variable with mean λ −1/3 . Hence the set C := {2, 3} is a cycle. As we did for states, one can define the exit height, exit rate and exit distribution for any cycle. Clearly, E(C) = 2/3 and p C = (0, 0, 0, 1). The order of the number of stages after which some states "merge into a cycle" is precisely the mixing height of the cycle. Hence, the mixing height of C is 1/3. As states 2 and 3 are evenly visited before leaving the cycle, its mixing distribution µ C is given by µ C = (0, 1 2 , 1 2 , 0). The exit rate can now be computed, averaging the exit rates of each state in the cycle with respect to the mixing distribution. We thus obtain r(C) = 1.
Time-scale 2/3. After ⌊λ −2/3−1/6 ⌋ stages, transitions between cycle C = {2, 3} and state 4 occur, and so do transitions between state 4 and 1. Hence, states 1, 2, 3 and 4 merge into a new cycle C ′ = {1, 2, 3, 4}. As C ′ is never left, we set by convention E(C ′ ) = +∞ and let the exit distribution undefined. The mixing height of C ′ is 2/3. The computation of the mixing distribution is less straightforward here. Nonetheless, let us make the two remarks:
(a) States 2 and 3 are visited with the same frequency, since these states have already merged into an evenly visited cycle.
(b) From the relation E(1) = 0 < E(C) = E(4) = 2/3 one can deduce that µ C ′ (1) = 0 and µ C ′ (k) > 0 for k = 2, 3, 4. Indeed, on the one hand state 1 is left very quickly in comparison to the other states in C ′ so that the frequency of visits to it tends to 0; on the other hand, the number of visits to 4 and to C (and thus to 2 and 3) is of the same order.
Further time-scales. As all states have merged into one cycle, there cannot be any new cycle. Also, once states have merged into a cycle, they behave as a single aggregated state. In particular, the relative frequency of visits to the states in the cycle remains constant. For instance, between stages 1 and ⌊λ −1−1/6 ⌋, the asymptotic frequency of visits to a state k is µ C ′ (k), regardless of the initial state. As the weights of these stages tend to 1, we obtain that:
Another remarkable fact about cycles is their structure of valued tree, where the value stands for the mixing heights:
The cycles decomposition of our example and their characteristics are summarized in the following table: cycles exit height exit rate exit distribution mixing height mixing distribution {1} 0 ln 2 (0,
Formal definitions
We are now ready to provide formal definitions. For any set A ⊂ K, we denote by
the first exit from A. The regularity of (Q λ ) λ (i.e. property 6) ensures that for any A ⊂ K, k ∈ A and k ′ ∈ K, the following limit exists:
Indeed, an explicit expression is given for each
as the ratio of sums with positive coefficients of finite products of entries of Q λ (see Lemma 3.3 in [7, Chapter 6] ). We can now define the notion of cycles.
Definition 3.2.
A cycle C is a subset of K which is either a single state or that contains at least two states and satisfies:
In particular, one has lim λ→0 P
That is, starting from state k ∈ C, the chain reaches k ′ before leaving the cycle, with a probability that goes to 1 as λ vanishes.
As we already illustrated in the example, the set of cycles has the structure of a valued tree for the set inclusion, with single states as leaves [4, Proposition 4.4] . In particular, any two cycles are either disjoint or one contains the other. Cycles which are not single states can be better understood thanks to the following characterization which justifies the name "cycle" [4, Proposition 4.3]: C is a cycle containing at least two states if and only if for all k, k ′ ∈ C, k = k ′ , the number N C (k, k ′ ) of round trips from k to k ′ performed by the chain starting from k and before leaving C satisfies:
Cycles can be obtained sequentially (see Trouvé [19, section 2.2] for an explicit algorithm) by looking at the Markov chain at different time-scales as illustrated in the previous example. Let us provide now the formal definitions for the exit height, exit rate, exit distribution, mixing height and mixing distribution of a cycle, neither of which depends on the initial position of the chain within the cycle. Let C be a cycle, as already noticed before. Recall that τ (C) := inf{m ≥ 1, k m / ∈ C} ∈ N * ∪ {+∞} is the first exit from C.
Definition 3.3. We say that E(C) ∈ [0, +∞] is the exit height of C if for every ε > 0 and k ∈ C one has: lim
Definition 3.4. Assume that E(C) < +∞. We say that r C ∈ (0, +∞) is the exit rate of C if for any α ≥ 0, one has lim
Definition 3.5. Assume that E(C) < +∞. We say that p C ∈ ∆(K) is the exit distribution of C if for any k ∈ C one has: lim
Definition 3.6. We say that M (C) ∈ [0, +∞) is the mixing height of a cycle C containing at least two states if it is the smallest positive real number such that for any ε > 0 and k, k
Definition 3.7. We say that µ C ∈ ∆(K) is a mixing distribution of a cycle C if for any function
where we write
N.B. Mixing distributions may not be uniquely defined. For cycles having
This way, the unique mixing distribution represents the frequency of visits to the states in the cycle before leaving it.
Before we proceed, let us provide some comments on these definitions:
1. Exit and mixing heights satisfy the following dichotomy: either E(C) = 0, which can only occur if C is a singleton, or 0 ≤ M (C) < E(C).
4. Mixing distributions are uniquely defined except for cycles with mixing height equal to 0 and which are periodic. To illustrate this phenomenon, consider a family of Markov chains over K = {1, 2, 3} whose asymptotic behavior, as λ vanishes, is given by:
The cycle C := {1, 2} is such that M (C) = 0 and E(C) = 1/2, so that for ℓ ∈ {1, 2} the functions f ℓ (λ) = 2⌊λ
converge to δ 1 and δ 2 respectively, because of the periodicity of the chain before leaving the cycle, and we set µ C = 1 2 (δ 1 + δ 2 ) in this case. More generally, cycles with mixing height equal to 0 and with a d-periodic behavior have exactly d mixing distributions.
5. The mixing distribution stands for the limit frequency of visits in the sense that for any cycle with positive exit height one has:
6. The exit and mixing distributions of a cycle C, when defined, are supported on K\C and C respectively.
7. The particular form of (Q λ ) λ (i.e. condition (6)) ensures that finite exit and mixing heights are multiples of 1/N .
Transient states and relevant cycles
As already noticed in Section 2.1.3 (see (2)), the cumulative weights of stages 1, 2, . . . , ⌊λ N.B. For any relevant cycle C = {k} which is a singleton, we set its mixing distribution as µ k := δ k . Definition 3.9. A state k ∈ K is transient if it does not belong to any relevant cycle.
Intuitively, relevant cycles are subsets of states in which the chain remains a positive fraction of the game before (possibly) leaving them. They are relevant in the sense that they matter for the asymptotic payoff of the game. They are obtained by cutting the valued tree of all cycles horizontally at the height 1 − . At this height, there are three cycles A = {1, 2}, B = {3, 4} and {5}, with exit heights are E(A) = 3/4, E(B) = 1 and E(5) = 1. Hence B and {5} are relevant cycles (B is recurrent and {5} is absorbing), whereas A is not relevant, so that states 1 and 2 are transient. The cycle C is not relevant, as its mixing height is bigger than Notation. The set of relevant cycles will be denoted by C 1 , . . . , C L (L ≥ 1). The set of transient states will be denoted by T R. An important consequence of the definitions above is that transient states and relevant cycles partition the state space, i.e:
The terms "transient", "recurrent" and "absorbing" have a different meaning than for usual Markov chains. First, transient states are not left once and for all and second, recurrent or even absorbing cycles may be left. We have chosen to use these same words here in order to emphasise the similarities with their traditional meaning. Indeed, the chain stays a negligible fraction of the game on the set of transient states T R before reaching some relevant cycle, where the chain stays a non-negligible fraction. Recurrent cycles are left before the game ends, whereas absorbing cycles are not left before the end of the game, i.e. stage ⌊λ
The position at any fraction t of the game
The aim of this section is to describe the asymptotic behaviour of (Q λ ) λ at the fraction t ∈ [0, 1] of the game. Recall that for any B ⊂ K, τ (B) = inf{m ≥ 1, k m / ∈ B} is the first exit from B and that, as already noticed before defining the cycles,
We can now introduce the matrix Φ ∈ R K×L of entrance laws, and the infinitesimal generator A ∈ R L×L . The former expresses the rapid transitions from states to relevant cycles, whereas the latter indicates the rates at which the chain jumps from one relevant cycle to another during the game. We set:
For any k ∈ K, the entrance law Φ(k, · ) is defined as:
Note that, for any k ∈ K one has
In particular, Φ(k, · ) is a probability over the set {1, . . . , L}. Indeed, by definition, one has max k∈T R E(k) ≤ 1 − 1 N so that the probability that the set of transient states is left before stage n(λ) tends to 1. Consequently, the probability that some non-transient state (and thus, the cycle containing it) is reached before stage n(λ) tends to 1. Finally, as min ℓ=1,...,L E(C ℓ ) ≥ 1, the probability that k n(λ) belongs to the same cycle that was first hit tends to 1.
A useful picture. The following picture may help the reader to visualize the decomposition of the state space into transient states and relevant cycles:
In the picture, the first relevant cycle is a recurrent cycle: the thick lines indicate the transitions that go out from it after a number of stages of order ⌊λ −1 ⌋. The dashed lines stemming out from the transient state k represent the rapid transitions from this state to the relevant cycles. Quantitatively, the probabilities of these transitions are given by Φ(k, · ). The rate at which the chain jumps from C 1 to another cycle, say C 2 , depends on two things: 1) the rate at which a direct transition between the two cycles occur, and 2) the rate at which a transition from C 1 to T R occurs that leads to C 2 . The former is given by r 1 k∈C2 p 1 (k), the second by r 1 k∈T R p 1 (k)Φ(k, 2). As Φ(k, 2) = 1 for all k ∈ C 2 , the total rate can be expressed with the following formula:
Definition 3.13. The infinitesimal generator A ∈ R L×L expresses the rates at which transitions occur from one relevant cycle to another. For each 1 ≤ ℓ = ℓ ′ ≤ L, one sets:
where r ℓ and p ℓ are the exit rate and exit distribution, respectively, of the cycle C ℓ . For 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ L, we set:
We now show that, up to a time-change and a projection matrix (namely the matrix of entrance laws Φ), the asymptotic behavior of (Q λ ) λ can be described by a continuous-time Markov chain over {1, . . . , L} with infinitesimal generator A. Proposition 3.14. For any t ∈ (0, 1), k ∈ K and 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ L one has:
Proof. Fix an initial state k ∈ K. From the definition of relevant cycles, it follows that lim λ→0 P k λ (k ⌊h/λ⌋ ∈ T R) = 0, for any h > 0. Hence, by the Markov property, for any 0 < h < α one has:
The result is then a direct consequence of the relation ϕ(λ, t) ∼ λ→0 − ln(1 − t)/λ, which makes a correspondence between stages 1, . . . , ⌊α/λ⌋ and the fraction 1 − e −α of the game, and of the two following equalities, which hold for all ℓ ′ ∈ {1, . . . , L} and are proven just below:
Fix 1 ≤ ℓ ′ ≤ L. By definition, the exit height of every transient state is strictly smaller than 1 −
2N
whereas the exit height of any relevant cycle is strictly larger. Hence, the probability that a chain starting from k leads to C ℓ ′ in n(λ) steps tends to Φ(k, ℓ ′ ). By definition, the exit rate r ′ of C ℓ ′ is strictly positive whenever C ℓ ′ is a recurrent cycle; set r ′ = 0 if C ℓ ′ is an absorbing cycle. Hence, the probability of leaving C ℓ ′ in less that h/λ steps tends to 1 − e −hr ′ as λ vanishes, which tends to 0 as h vanishes. This proves (13) . Similarly, we prove (14) by noticing that, as the probability of leaving C ℓ ′ in less that h/λ steps tends to hr ′ +o(h), the probability of leaving more than once some relevant cycle in less than h/λ steps is bounded by max ℓ=1,...,L (hr ℓ + o(h)) 2 = o(h). Consequently, up to an error term of order o(h), in order to go from C ℓ ′ to another cycle C ℓ in less than h/λ steps, the chain needs to leave exactly once C ℓ ′ and then go to C ℓ (possibly through the set of transient states), which occurs precisely with probability
Similarly, up to an error term of order o(h), in order to still be in C ℓ ′ after h/λ steps, the chain needs either not to leave the cycle at all, or leave it exactly once and then "land back" in C ℓ ′ , which occurs with probability 1 − hr
We thus obtain, for any α > 0 and small h:
which is equivalent to (14) . 
In view of Proposition 3.14, for any initial state k ∈ K and t ∈ [0, 1], we can now define the asymptotic position of the state at the fraction t of the game Γ λ (k) as λ vanishes. For every 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ L, let µ ℓ denote the mixing distribution of the cycle C ℓ . Recall that µ ℓ is well-defined (with the convention that µ ℓ = δ k if C = {k}) and is supported on
Definition 3.16. For any time t ∈ [0, 1), the matrix π t ∈ R K×K of positions at time t is defined by:
For any cycle C, any k ∈ K and any t ∈ (0, 1) one has:
holds for every state k ∈ K, unless k belongs to a relevant cycle C with M (C) = 0 and which has a periodic behavior before n(λ). In this case, only the following "relaxed form" holds:
where d is the minimum common multiple of all periods. Note that taking d = |K|! one has an expression which holds for any initial state k ∈ K of the game.
3. The mapping π t : K → ∆(K) can be understood as follows. First, Φ takes the initial state to a probability over the relevant cycles. Then, up to a time-change α → 1 − e −α , the chain evolves like a chain in continuous-time with generator A. Hence, the matrix e Aα maps initial probabilities over the relevant cycles at time 0, to probabilities over the relevant cycles at time 1 − e −α . Finally, M maps probabilities over relevant cycles to the corresponding frequency of visits to the states inside the cycle. Thus:
Note that Φ and M describe very rapid phenomena compared to the transitions between relevant cycles, described by A. Explicitly, for any k, k ′ ∈ K one has:
Lemma 3.17. The following properties hold:
1. For any cycle C and any k, k
states in the cycles, and any k ∈ K:
Proof. The first relation follows from the definition of π t , since Φ(k, · ) = Φ(k ′ , · ) for any pair of states k, k ′ belonging to the same relevant cycle. The second follows from conditioning at stage n(λ) and letting λ to 0. Indeed, as in (12), for any relevant cycle C the definition of Φ and of cycle yield:
Proposition 3.14 and the definition of mixing distributions imply the following result: 
Hence, for all α > 0:
where the second equality stems from a change of variables. From this equality, and the fact that for all t ∈ (0, 1), ϕ(λ, t) is equivalent to − ln(1 − t)/λ as λ vanishes, one deduces the result. The result is obvious for t = 0; it is obtained by continuity for t = 1.
Part 2: The cumulated payoff
We studied in Section 3.1 the asymptotic behavior of
, where Q λ is the transition matrix of the Markov chain induced by the optimal Puiseux strategy profile (
It is now easy to deduce some properties on the asymptotic behavior of the cumulated payoff
Let us denote its limit by g * := lim λ→0 g * λ , which exists by the choice of (x 1 λ , x 2 λ ). For any w ∈ R K , let ν, w = k∈K ν(k)w(k) denote the scalar product in R K .
Remark 3.19. Note that, by stationarity, every time state k ′ is visited, the expected payoff to Player 1 is given by g λ (k ′ ). Hence, for any k ∈ K and t ∈ [0, 1]:
The boundedness of both terms inside the scalar product implies then:
The following result is thus a direct consequence of Corollary 3.18 and Remark 3.19.
Lemma 3.20. For any k ∈ K and t ∈ [0, 1] one has:
As the state space is partitioned into transient states and relevant cycles, we have the following dichotomy: either the initial state is transient or it belongs to one (and exactly one) relevant cycle. The following result will allow us to reduce our problem to initial states which belong to a recurrent cycle.
Lemma 3.21. Let C ℓ be some relevant cycle. Then:
(ii) If C ℓ is absorbing, then for every k ∈ K and t ∈ [0, 1] one has lim λ→0 γ λ (k,
Proof. (i) Let k ∈ C ℓ . The optimality of the strategy profile (x 
As already noticed (see Lemma 3.17), for any k, k
for every t and k ′ , where µ ℓ is the mixing distribution of C ℓ . Indeed, the cycle C ℓ is never left and the position at time t is entirely described by the mixing distribution. By Lemma 3.20 one has lim λ→0 γ λ (k, x 1 λ , x 2 λ ; t) = t µ ℓ , g * for all t, and the result follows from the fact that lim λ→0 γ λ (k, x From Lemma 3.21 one gets some valuable information about the constant payoff property.
• By (i), the limit value is independent of the initial state, within every relevant cycle.
• By (ii), the weak constant payoff property (i.e. Theorem 3.1) holds for initial state belonging to an absorbing cycle.
• By (iii), the weak constant payoff property holds as far as it holds for any initial state belonging to some relevant cycle. Together with the previous comment, it follows that the proof of Theorem 3.1 reduces to the proof of this result for initial states belonging to a recurrent cycle.
In view of these remarks, from now on, we will focus on initial states belonging to a recurrent cycle.
Part 3: Values and occupation measures
In this section, we start by establishing two useful formulas relating the limit value v * and the matrix of limit occupation measures Π (see Definition 3.22 below), for each recurrent cycle. Second, we prove some variational inequalities satisfied by the discounted values (v λ ) λ , in terms of some discounted occupation measures Π λ,λ,λ ′ (see Definition 3.25 below). Third, we deduce from these two results some important invariance properties satisfied by the limit value and the occupation measure.
Two useful formulas
Throughout this section, let C be a fixed recurrent cycle and let r > 0, p ∈ ∆(K) and µ ∈ ∆(K) denote, respectively, its exit rate, exit distribution and mixing distribution. The aim of this section is to relate these quantities to the limit value v * (k) of any state k ∈ C and to the limit occupation measure, defined as follows.
Definition 3.22. The limit occupation matrix Π ∈ R K×K is defined by:
The existence of this limit is a particular case of Corollary 3.18, which implies that Π =
we denote by Π k ∈ ∆(K) the k-th row of Π. It represents the limit discounted occupation time for the Markov chain (Q λ ) λ starting from state k, that is:
Proposition 3.23. For any k ∈ C:
Proof. Let τ := inf{m ≥ 1, k m / ∈ C} be the exit time from C, and let k ∈ C. The stationarity of the strategies and the strong Markov property imply that for every function f : K → R one has:
) Let us compute the limit of the two terms in the right-hand side of (15), as λ vanishes. By the definition of inverse clock ϕ and of the exit rate r, for all t ∈ (0, 1) one has:
Hence, the random variable whose law is The definition of the mixing distribution yields:
Similarly, the definition of the exit distribution implies:
Both formulas follow from particular choices of the function f . Indeed, (i) is obtained by replacing f with g * (see Remark 3.19) and (ii) by replacing f with (1 { · =k ′ } ) k∈K .
Part 3: Values and occupation measures 3 THE WEAK CONSTANT PAYOFF PROPERTY
A variational inequality
Let us start by a technical transportation lemma for discounted averages of real, bounded sequences (a m ) m≥1 . It establishes a relation between m≥1 λ(1 − λ) m−1 a m and a convex combination of partial sums
Lemma 3.24. Let 0 < λ ′ < λ < 1 and r :=
Then, for all real, bounded sequences (a m ) m≥1 :
Proof. It is enough to show that, for each ℓ ≥ 1, the coefficients of a ℓ in the left-hand and righthand sides coincide. Set W ℓ := k≥ℓ w k for all ℓ ≥ 1 so that w ℓ = W ℓ − W ℓ+1 for all ℓ ≥ 1. In the left-hand side expression, a ℓ appears as far as m − 1 ≥ ℓ, and always multiplied by λ
On the right-hand side, the coefficient for a ℓ is trivially equal to
The result then follows from the choice of w:
We are now ready to apply this result to stochastic games. To do so, let us start by defining a family of occupation measures. 
Proof. Recall that λ 0 > 0 is such that all the functions λ → x 
The continuity of the map (λ, λ ′ , λ ′′ ) → Π λ,λ ′ ,λ ′′ follows from the continuity of (λ ′ , λ ′′ ) → Q λ ′ ,λ ′′ and the invertibility of Id − (1 − λ)Q λ ′ ,λ ′′ , which holds because this matrix is diagonally dominant, for any λ > 0.
Remark 3.27. Note that Π = lim λ→0 Π λ,λ,λ , so that in particular the limit exists on the diagonal.
The following result relates the discounted payoff for two different discount factors λ and λ ′ in terms of the occupation measure Π λ,λ,λ ′ and the discounted values. It will be useful in the sequel. 
The weights
.28 are positive and add up to 1.
Proof. On the one hand, by the definition of σ 1 , conditional on {X = m} the payoff after stage m is given by ( 
That is, by stationarity of the payoff, optimality of the profile (x 1 λ ′ , x 2 λ ′ ) and the Markov property:
On the other hand, again by the definition of σ 1 , conditional on {X = m} the players have used the strategies (x 
Thus, setting
, one has:
Consequently:
Let us now rewrite the two terms in the right-hand side. For the first term, by Lemma 3.24, letting r :=
For the second term, note that
Hence, summation yields:
which concludes the proof.
The main consequence of Proposition 3.28 is that it allows to derive some variational inequalities satisfied by the discounted values, as well as an explicit expression for its derivative.
Proposition 3.29. The following relations hold for all 0 < λ ′ < λ and k ∈ K:
Recall that the weights
are positive and add up to 1. Remark 3.30. This inequality is inspired from Lemma 3.7 in [6] . Though this last piece of work deals with a quite different topic, it turns out that an analogy can be made between solutions of discounted Hamilton-Jacobi equations and the family of values (v λ ) λ .
, and let k be some initial state.
(
(ii) Multiplying the payoff by −1, exchanging players' roles and applying the previous inequality yields the result.
(iii) Rearranging the terms in (i), one has:
A similar relation is obtained from (ii) so that
Thanks to Lemma 3.26, we have
Taking λ ′ to λ in (17) yields the result.
From Proposition 3.29 we deduce the following crucial relation between v * and Π. 
In both cases, taking λ to 0 yields Π k , v * = v * (k), which proves the result.
Combining the formulas of Proposition 3.23, which hold for each recurrent cycle, and the invariance property established in Corollary 3.31, we prove the following result.
Corollary 3.32. Let C be a recurrent cycle with exit distribution p and mixing distribution µ. Then, for any k ∈ C one has:
Taking the scalar product in Proposition 3.23 (ii) yields:
where r > 0 is the exit rate of C. As µ is supported on C by definition, and the limit values are constant on C (see Lemma 3.21 (i)) one has µ, v
so that (18) can be rewritten as
The choice of the cycle (i.e. C is recurrent) implies that r > 0, so that v * (k) = p, v * . Proposition 3.23 (i) yields then the equality µ, g * = v * (k), which concludes the proof.
Note that the previous result can be read as follows: for any recurrent cycle C and any k ∈ C, the average payoff obtained before leaving the cycle, and the expected value starting from the exit state, both coincide and are equal to v * (k).
Part 4: A limit martingale
We already argued (see Lemma 3.21 (i)) that the limit values are constant inside relevant cycles. For each 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ L let v * ℓ be the limit value starting from (any state of) C ℓ , and let v * ∈ R L be the corresponding vector. Similarly, let π t (k, ℓ) := k ′ ∈C ℓ π t (k, k ′ ) be the probability of being in the cycle C ℓ at time t, starting from k ∈ K, and let π t ∈ R K×L be the corresponding matrix. The next lemma will be very useful in order to establish the invariance property π t v * = v * for all t ∈ [0, 1], which generalizes Corollary 3.31.
Lemma 3.33. The following relations hold:
Proof. Recall that, by definition, Φ ∈ R K×L , A ∈ R L×L , M ∈ R L×K and π t ∈ R K×K . Hence, the first two relations are equalities in R K , while the two last ones are equalities in R L . The first relation is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.21 (i) and (iii), which imply that
Similarly, (ii) holds because for each k ∈ K and t ∈ [0, 1] one has:
The relation (iii) is straightforward too: by definition, the ℓ-th coordinate of M v * is equal to µ ℓ , v * , where µ ℓ is the mixing distribution of C ℓ . But this equals v * ℓ because µ ℓ is supported on C ℓ and because the value is constant on cycles. To prove (iv), let us fix ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , L} and recall that by definition A(ℓ, ℓ
, where r ℓ > 0 and p ℓ ∈ ∆(K) are, respectively, the exit rate and exit distribution of C ℓ . Hence:
where the first and last equalities come from the definition of A, the second follows from (i), the third from the relation k∈K p ℓ (k)v * (k) = v * ℓ obtained in Corollary 3.32, and the fourth one from
One can deduce the following invariance property for the limit values.
Proof. It is enough to prove that π 0 v * = v * and ( ∂ ∂t π t )v * = 0. The first relation holds because by definition π 0 v * = ΦM v * , which is equal to v * by Lemma 3.33 (i) and (iii). For the second, set ν α := π 1−e −α = Φe αA for all α ≥ 0. By Lemma 3.33 (ii), it is enough to prove that ( ∂ ∂t π t ) v * = 0. But this follows from Lemma 3.33 (iv), since for all α ≥ 0 one has: 
36. We already proved that the limit value is constant inside relevant cycles. Not surprisingly, it is also constant inside any cycle (in the usual sense of the word) of mixing height strictly smaller than 1 − 1 2N , since these states act as a single, aggregated state from the very beginning of the game. More surprisingly, the value is also constant inside the recurrence classes of the continuous-time chain of generator A. Thus, if the cycle structure induced by an optimal Puiseux strategy profile was the one in the example of Section 3.1.2, the limit value function would then be independent from the initial state.
A continuous-time Shapley equation
We can now end the proof of Theorem 3.1. To do so, let us prove a continuous-time version of Shapley equation. 
Proof. By Shapley [14] for any λ ∈ (0, 1] and any initial state k 1 one has:
Iterating the previous relation, for any t ∈ [0, 1) and k ∈ K one has:
As λ converges to 0, the first term in the right-hand-side converges to t 0 π s (k, · ), g * ds by Lemma 3.20. For the second term, one has lim λ→0 (1 − λ) ϕ(λ,t) = 1 − t and by Proposition 3.14 and the definition of π t : lim
The weak constant payoff property (i.e. Theorem 3.1) follows now from Lemma 3.20, Proposition 3.37 and Corollary 3.34. Indeed, for each initial state k belonging to a recurrent cycle one has:
By Lemma 3.21 (ii) the constant payoff property holds for any initial state belonging to an absorbing cycle. Finally, Lemma 3.21 (iii) implies that the property also holds for any initial state which is transient. Indeed, for any such k ∈ T R one has, for any selection (
Hence, the weak constant property holds for any initial state. To obtain the uniform convergence, note that for every λ ∈ (0, λ 0 ), the functions t → γ λ (k, x 1 λ , x 2 λ ; t) are equi-Lipschitz (with constant g ); the pointwise convergence implies the uniform convergence. The proof of Theorem 3.1 is complete.
Remark 3.38. Derivating the relation
which is a reformulation of the constant payoff property.
The strong constant payoff property
The aim of this section is to prove our main result: Theorem 2.5. Roughly speaking, we want to prove that the constant payoff property, which is true for any optimal Puiseux strategy profile, holds for any couple of optimal strategies. The main idea is the following: an equivalence between the strong payoff property and the convergence to 0 of the discounted values of a certain class of Markov decision processes. We start with a technical property for real sequences, from which we derive an equivalent formulation of the strong payoff property.
) the set of optimal strategies for Player 1 (resp., 2) in the one-shot zero-sum game with action sets I and J and payoff:
The following lemma is a direct consequence of [13, Corollary 2.6.3, p.56]. We state it for Player 1 but, as players have symmetric roles, a similar result holds for Player 2. 
The sequence being fixed throughout Section 4.1.1, for each δ > 0 we set: 
Note that (t m ) m≥1 depends on λ and δ, but we have preferred to omit this dependence to simplify the notation. Let f δ λ : [0, 1) → R be the linear interpolation of (u λ m ) m≥1 through the sequence of times (t m ) m≥1 , i.e.
Part 5: A technical lemma
By construction,
Consequently, (ii) implies that
Let s ∈ [0, 1). Let U be an accumulation point of (u λ ϕ(λ,s) ) λ∈ (0, 1] . Because this family is uniformly bounded it is enough to prove that U = 0. Let (λ n ) n≥1 be a vanishing sequence such that lim n→+∞ u (3)- (4)) that one has lim λ→0 η(δλ, ϕ(δλ, t)) = t, and thus:
and lim
From the equalities (21) and (24), the fact that (f δ λ ) λ is uniformly bounded by C and the definition of F , one obtains:
By the change of variables s := 1 − (1 − t) 1/δ , we get
As (26) holds for any δ > 0, it follows that for any polynomial function P , one has:
Because F is continuous, this property implies that F = 0. Hence, we have proved that f 
Application to stochastic games
The goal of this section is to provide several alternative characterizations of the strong payoff property which will be used to establish Theorem 2.5. (ii) For all k ∈ K, for all t ∈ [0, 1),
(iii) For all k ∈ K, for all δ > 0 one has:
Proof. Let us start by proving the equivalence between (i) and (ii). Shapley equation yields:
where k m stands for the state at stage m, for any m ∈ N * . Consequently:
The equivalence follows then from the relation lim λ→0 (1 − λ) ϕ(λ,t)−1 = 1 − t. Let us now prove that (i) and (iii) are equivalent. Let (σ 1 λ , σ 2 λ ) λ be a fixed family of optimal strategies. For each λ ∈ (0, 1] and m ≥ 1, define
Note that the family of sequences (u 
4.2 Part 6: The auxiliary MDP Let δ > 0 andk ∈ K be fixed. For each λ ∈ (0, 1], consider a Markov Decision Process (one-player stochastic game) M DPk ,δ,λ with state space K, action set
Remark 4.5. At each state, the decision-maker can only play couples of optimal mixed strategies of the game given in (19) . Hence, the sets of possible actions depend on the state and on the discount factor. Similarly, the payoff function does not depend on the actions but depends on the discount factor.
For any couple of optimal strategies (σ
λ of the original λ-discounted stochastic and any initial state k ∈ K, define:
Let w δ λ (k) denote the value of this MDP with initial state k, i.e.: We resort to the semi-algebraic approach. Note that, unlike the classical setup described in Section 2.1.2, where a two-player zero-sum stochastic game Γ was fixed and the discount factor λ was put to 0, here we have a Markov Decision Process M DPk ,δ,λ (thus, one player only) which depends on λ through its action set and payoff function. Nonetheless, the semi-algebraic approach still applies.
) ∈ S ε if, and only if, the following relations hold:
• v ∈ R K is the vector of values of the λ-discounted stochastic game Γ λ
The set S ǫ is semi-algebraic, as it can be described by the following finite set of polynomial equalities and inequalities (compare with the system in Section 2.1.2):
By assumption, lim sup λ→0 w δ λ (k) > ǫ, thus there exists a vanishing subsequence (λ n ) such that for all n, the set S ǫ (λ n ) is non-empty. By semi-algebraicity, there exists λ 0 ∈ (0, 1] such that S ǫ (λ) is non-empty for all λ ∈ (0, λ 0 ). From the Tarski-Seidenberg elimination theorem, it admits a semi-algebraic selection for λ ∈ (0, λ 0 ). In particular, there exists a selection of stationary strategies z λ := (x 
Remarks and extensions
The aim of this section is to provide some final remarks, mainly through examples, and extend our main result in two directions.
An example
Let us illustrate the constant payoff property by an example, studied by Kohlberg [2] . The state space is the set K = {1 * , k, ℓ, −1 * }, where a * denotes an absorbing state with payoff a, that is q( · | a * , i, j) = δ a * and g(a * , i, j) = a for all (i, j) ∈ I × J. The transition from states k and ℓ are deterministic and represented by the two following matrices:
The set of actions are I = {T, B} and J = {L, R}. Finally, the payoff function is given by
Optimal stationary strategies satisfy
so that the induced Markov chain satisfies:
For simplicity of the presentation, we will write the vectors v, v and g as row vectors, instead of column vectors -which they are. The limit value is v * = (1, 0, 0, −1). The cycles decomposition and their characteristics are summarized in the following table: cycles exit height exit rate exit distribution mixing height mixing distribution 
Cycle C 2 is recurrent since its mixing height and exit height are, respectively, M (C 2 ) = 1/2 and E(C 2 ) = 1, whereas C 1 = {1 * } and C 3 = {−1 * } are absorbing cycles. To express the matrix π t ∈ R 4×4 of instantaneous positions at time t, it is enough to determine the entrance law Φ ∈ R 4×3 , the matrix of mixing distributions M ∈ R 3×4 and the infinitesimal generator A ∈ R 3×3 . As there are no transient states, Φ is trivial, whereas M is easily obtained by symmetry: 
The constant payoff is a joint property
Contrary to non-zero sum games, where the notion of Nash equilibrium is a joint property of the players' strategies, the notion of optimality is unilateral in zero-sum games. Indeed, by playing an optimal strategy, Player 1 ensures that his payoff is greater or equal than the value regardless of the strategy used by his opponent (and similarly for Player 2). Naturally, one would like to know whether the constant payoff property is an unilateral property as well. That is, can Player 1 ensure that the average payoff at time t is greater or equal than the value at all times t ∈ (0, 1]?
Stochastic games with imperfect monitoring 5 REMARKS AND EXTENSIONS
The following example gives a negative answer to this question: playing an optimal strategy does not ensure that the average payoffs are greater or equal than the value at all times. Rather, the constant payoff property requires both players to play optimally. The example is "as bad as it can be", since the unique optimal strategy of Player 1 guarantees strictly less than the value at any time t ∈ (0, 1), where the fact that this property holds for t = 1 follows from the optimality of his strategy.
Consider the "Big Match", introduced by Gillette [8] , a stochastic game with set of states K = {k, 0 * , 1 * }, action sets I = {T, B} and J = {L, R}, and where states 0 * and 1 * are absorbing with payoff 0 and 1 respectively, i.e. for all (i, j) ∈ I × J: q( · |0 * , i, j) = δ 0 * , q( · |1 * , i, j) = δ 1 * , g(0 * , i, j) = 0 and g(1 * , i, j) = 1
The game with initial state k, the non-absorbing state, can be represented as follows: 2 ) is given by π t (k, · ) = (1 − t, 0, t). Similarly, the limit payoff vector is g * = (0, 0, 1). By Lemma 3.20, for all t ∈ [0, 1] one has:
The relation t 2 2 < tv * (k) for all t ∈ (0, 1) shows that the payoff does not grow linearly during the game. In fact, Player 2 obtains strictly less than the value (and this is favorable to him) at all times except for t = 1.
Stochastic games with imperfect monitoring
Our results extend directly to stochastic games with imperfect monitoring (a.k.a. stochastic games with signals). Compared to the model studied in the paper, suppose that the players observe the state, but not the actions; rather, they receive private signals about them. Formally, a stochastic game with imperfect monitoring is defined by a tuple (K, I, J, A 1 , A 2 , g, q) where K, I, J and g : K × I × J → R, are, as before, the set of states, actions for Player 1 and 2, and payoff function, the sets A 1 and A 2 are the set of signals for player 1 and 2 respectively, and
is a transition function. The game goes as follows: every time a pair (i, j) of actions is played at state k, a triplet (k ′ , a 1 , a 2 ) is chosen according to q(k, i, j). The new state k ′ is announced to both players, and Player 1 and 2 are privately informed of a 1 and a 2 , respectively. The constant payoff property can be defined in exactly the same way as in Section 2. Note that the proof of the weak payoff constant property only relies on the semi-algebraic approach of Section 2.1.2. By Shapley [14] , the equations of Section 2.1.2 are also satisfied in a stochastic game with imperfect monitoring. Consequently, the weak constant payoff property extends to this class. As for the strong payoff property, Lemma 3.29 extends to this model with the same proof. Thus, Theorem 2.5 holds in this more general setup.
Theorem 5.2. Any stochastic game with imperfect monitoring satisfies the strong payoff property.
Asymptotically optimal strategies
In this section we provide an extension of Theorem 3.1. As a matter of fact, our proof only involved the leading terms in the expansions of the optimal Puiseux strategy profile (x 1 λ , x 2 λ ). Consequently, our result can be extended beyond optimal Puiseux strategies, to a larger family of strategies which belong to the class of asymptotically optimal strategies: the family (σ 
Similarly, for each k, one has lim λ→0 γ λ (k, x λ are no longer optimal strategies. However, the three results hold up to a vanishing error term, so that the rest of the proof goes through as well.
The previous result applies, in particular, to a simple stationary strategy profile obtained by truncating the Puiseux series after the first term. That is, let (c(k, i), e(k, i)) and (c(k, j), e(k, j)) be the leading coefficients and exponents of the Puiseux series x These "truncated strategies", which are described by pairs coefficient-exponent for each pair actionstate, are asymptotically optimal (but not necessarily optimal) and satisfy the constant payoff property.
